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An Up-Close Perspective: The Enforcement of 
Federal Immigration Laws by                                 
State and Local Police 
Maria Fernanda Parra-Chico1 
INTRODUCTION 
The attacks of September 11, 2001, evoked a debate over whether, and to 
what extent, the federal government should employ the resources and 
efforts of local law enforcement agencies to carry out U.S. immigration law 
mandates.2  Today, state and local governments—working closely with 
federal authorities—are enacting laws and ordinances seeking to increase 
the regulation of noncitizens.3  Such regulation exhibits a clash of 
authorities: the federal government enforcing immigration law as a foreign 
policy issue, and state and local governments enforcing immigration law via 
their own laws and ordinances.4  Across the country, state and local 
governments are enacting laws and ordinances that criminalize harboring, 
transporting, or hiring undocumented immigrants; that prevent the provision 
of state assistance to undocumented families; that impose fines on landlords 
who rent to undocumented persons; and that authorize local police to 
question the immigration status of anyone detained or arrested.5  The 
federal government is essentially subcontracting the enforcement of 
immigration law to state and local sectors, through the criminalization of 
immigrants and the delegation of criminal and civil immigration law 
enforcement.  These changes have wrongly placed city, county, and state 
local law enforcement at the intersection of criminal justice and 
immigration law.6   
The Supreme Court has held that Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution 
grants Congress and the federal government the sole authority to enforce 
immigration law.7  Localities can only legally enforce immigration law 
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when they have signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the 
federal government, deputizing local police officers to enforce immigration 
law.8  Yet some localities persist in enforcing civil immigration law even 
w
ion enforcement, the state of Washington is wise not to 
ad
aise awareness about issues affecting immigrants and 
th
ithout an MOA. 
The state of Washington, generally known to be an immigrant-friendly 
state,9 has not signed an MOA with the federal government to deputize its 
police to enforce immigration law.10  However, some police are still 
enforcing immigration law both by partnering with Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (ICE) and by acting independently as immigration 
agents, without any basis in federal or state law for their actions.  Though 
MOAs provide police with lists of their responsibilities and duties with 
respect to immigrat
opt an MOA.11   
Local enforcement of civil immigration laws raises many daunting legal, 
logistical, and resource issues for state and local agencies and the diverse 
communities they serve.  The role that local law enforcement plays within 
the immigrant community should be guided and assessed to promote the 
well-being of all.  This article will clarify local law enforcement’s role in 
the enforcement of civil immigration law and will illustrate why these 
officials should not act as immigration agents or adhere to policies that 
repress the immigrant community.  This article presents proposals for 
reform that thwart local agendas to enforce anti-immigrant laws, enhance 
public safety, and r
eir communities.  
Part I of this article presents a historical and legal analysis of the 
development of laws in the federal, state, and local sectors.  Part II 
discusses the negative consequences of immigration enforcement at the 
state and local level and examines how this enforcement undermines the 
relationship between local law enforcement and the communities it serves.  
Part III presents the state of Washington as a case study to further delineate 
how the encroachment of local law enforcement into the immigration 
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arena—when not guided by an affirmative, immigrant-friendly approach—
can criminalize immigrants and lead to exhorbitant costs on a fiscal and 
social level. Part IV proposes several changes at both the national and local 
levels, including a ban on the enforcement of immigration law by police 
officers and tactics that will rebuild trust in and dispel fear of the police.  
Ultimately, the section proposes a remedial course of action to ensure that 
citizens and community members can benefit from the positive influence 
lice should p ay in their comm nities.   
I. ES OF LOCAL 
E F I L  
A.
hat local police authorities could not enforce civil 
im
that po  l u
 THE HISTORY, LEGALITY, AND PROCEDURAL ISSU
NFORCEMENT OF EDERAL MMIGRATION AW
 Legal Uncertainty as to the Role of Local Police Enforcement 
Before 9/11, local police officers rarely enforced immigration law.12  It 
was accepted law and practice that police could enforce only criminal 
immigration violations and not civil immigration violations.13  Criminal 
violations include reentry after deportation, failure to depart after an order 
of removal, and most crimes involving moral turpitude or categorized as 
aggravated felonies.14  Civil violations include illegal presence and failure 
to depart after the expiration of a temporary visa.15  The division between 
civil and criminal immigration law enforcement was established by the 
court in Gonzalez v. City of Peoria, the MOA provisions of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952,16 and the Department of Justice (DOJ).  
All three indicate t
migration laws.17 
However, in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, issues of national security and 
immigration raised the question of whether local police could assist with 
immigration enforcement.18  The DOJ Office of Legal Counsel, under 
Attorney General John Ashcroft, issued a memorandum that stated that 
local officers have “inherent authority” to enforce both criminal and civil 
provisions of federal immigration law.19  The memorandum, made public 
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after a controversial struggle to obtain it, revealed a significant shift in DOJ 
immigration policy.20  It concluded that states, as sovereign entities, have 
the authority to enforce all federal laws and that “federal statutory law poses 
no obstacle to the authority of state police to arrest aliens on the basis of 
ci
vil immigration law unless mandated by 
B.  Immigration Law Enforcement: Due 
 between traditional police officer duties and immigration agents’ 
1. 
vil deportability.”21  
Despite information in the DOJ memorandum suggesting otherwise, state 
action regarding immigration enforcement must be consistent with federal 
authority.22  Federal law states that the federal government and Congress 
have the sole authority to enforce civil immigration law.23  Local police do 
not have the authority to enforce ci
federal law, pursuant to an MOA.  
Federal and State Overlap of
Process and Developments 
Today we see a blurring of lines of authority between federal and local 
law enforcement of both criminal and civil immigration laws.24  Proposed 
federal legislation would declare local law enforcement officers to have 
inherent power to enforce immigration laws.25  This would in essence 
merge the immigration-enforcement sector with the criminal justice sector.  
This section identifies the due process issues involved when police venture 
into immigration regulation, and it identifies problems with the melding of 
authority
duties.   
Due Process Issues 
While there are many parallels between criminal procedure and 
immigration law, the two areas invoke vastly different constitutional 
protections.26  The rights of criminal suspects are embodied in the Fourth, 
Fifth, and Sixth Amendments; immigration law is governed by the Due 
Process Clause.27  In criminal law, police can consensually communicate 
with an individual without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, 
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forcibly stop and briefly detain a person when there is reasonable suspicion, 
and arrest an individual when issued a warrant or with probable cause 
(when the facts and circumstances indicate an individual has or is 
committing a criminal offense).28  Immigration law, on the other hand, 
grants authorized officers the authority to interrogate individuals and to 
make warrantless arrests of anyone they believe is unlawfully in the United 
States.29  Thus civil immigration investigations do not necessarily afford the 
same level of protection as criminal investigations.  Individuals may be 
questioned by police because of their race, skin color, name, or the language 
they speak, and subsequently be arrested for a civil immigration violation.  
If local police arrest individuals based on a civil deportation order or a 
listing in the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) database, such 
arrests are likely to be based on evidence that falls short of the requisite 
probable cause standard.30  If immigration status is to become a question of 
importance in criminal enforcement, then care must be taken to ensure that 
the evidence supports a criminal enforcement.   Violations of individual 
constitutional rights, which are more likely to occur when local police 
2.
t federal immigration laws are enforced exclusively by 
31
 a
enforce immigration law, should be disconcerting to all Americans.   
 Developments: Devices Used to Blur Federal and State Authority 
Disregarding the constitutional implications, the DOJ continues to put 
pressure on state and local governments via particular mechanisms and 
strategies.  These developments reflect a “sea of change in the traditional 
understanding tha
federal agents.”  
) Memoranda of Agreement 
Nonfederal law enforcement agencies may enter into MOAs with the 
federal government, allowing the agencies’ deputized officers to enforce 
criminal and civil immigration law.32  In effect, section 287(g) of the INA 
provides that state and local authorities may take on roles traditionally 
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reserved for the federal government.33  The U.S. Attorney General, at the 
request of the state or local entity, enters into an MOA with the entity and 
directly supervises the law enforcement group.34  Currently, there are sixty-
three active MOAs across the United States, and  the waitlist is long.35  ICE 
credits the MOA program with identifying more than seventy thousand 
individuals, most already incarcerated, who are suspected of being in the 
co
comparison to federal immigration agents, 
to
n undocumented alien.43  Racial profiling is likely in such a 
context.     
untry “illegally.”36  
The basic training standards required by the MOA for local law 
enforcement officers are controversial.37  The ICE training course for MOA 
officers typically takes four weeks, whereas federal immigration officers are 
trained for five months.38  Generally, ICE officers must attend a seventeen-
week Immigration Agent Basic Training, and agents in the field complete 
additional on-the-job training.39  Thus, there is an increased likelihood of 
racial profiling and civil rights violations when local law enforcement 
officers are minimally trained, in 
 enforce immigration laws. 40   
MOAs grant local law enforcement the authority to independently do the 
following: interrogate individuals in order to determine probable cause for 
an immigration arrest; prepare immigration detainers and affidavits; take 
sworn statements; transport aliens under arrest; notify ICE within twenty-
four hours of any arrests made under this authority; prepare a Notice to 
Appear (NTA) for immigration purposes; and assist in pre- and post-arrest 
case processing of individuals taken into custody by ICE.41  The power to 
issue a detainer is one of the most troubling delegations of authority by the 
MOAs.  A detainer, in essence, means that any individual, suspected of 
violating an immigration law cannot be released on bond from jail until 
federal immigration agents determine the individual’s immigration status.42  
Thus, law enforcement officers can arrest an individual, and under MOA 
authority, place an “immigration detainer” on him with the belief  that the 
person is a
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MOAs result from negotiation between the federal government and states 
or localities for delegation of civil immigration law enforcement 
authority.44  Since the local law enforcement agency’s powers, duties, and 
duration of authority are subject to negotiation, it is quite possible that an 
MOA can be agreed upon that partly protects individual civil rights.45  
Provisions for proper training of officers and procedures for complaints and 
redress when the laws are improperly applied would go a long way toward 
protections of individual civil rights.  But even these possible additions to 
the negotiated terms of the MOA do not rectify the danger MOAs pose.46   
Unfortunately, MOAs are indicia of an anti-immigrant trend to detain and 
deport anyone suspected of violating immigration law. The flawed logic of 
MOAs is that allowing local police to detain a large number of people for a 
broad range of minor offenses, including civil immigration offenses, makes 
it easier to catch the small percentage of undocumented persons who are 
violent criminals.47  Correct logic recognizes that “criminals”—those who 
threaten public safety—are no more likely to be present in the immigrant 
population than in the general population.  At the same time, many criminal 
violations, such as theft, assault, and fraud, trigger immigration violations. 
48  When MOAs make immigration enforcement a police officer’s duty, 
safeguards must be in place to assure that individuals merely unlawfully 
present in the United States are not unfairly equated with individuals guilty 
of a deportable criminal offense for which they are deemed a threat to 
public safety. 
b). The Expansion of the NCIC Database  
Currently, police may access the FBI’s criminal database, the NCIC,  for 
everyday stops and encounters.  Since 2001, the INS has begun to enter 
civil immigration information into the NCIC.49  With access to the NCIC 
database, local law enforcement can query the immigration status of 
detained indivdiuals.  This results in noncitizens being arrested for 
suspected civil immigration violations.50   
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The NCIC database, a computerized tool used to assist law enforcement 
officers in identifying criminal suspects, contains “subfiles” of information 
on an expansive range of criminal activity listings.51  Prior to August 2003, 
the listings pertinent to immigration enforcement were limited to criminal 
immigration violations such as re-entry after deportation, which is an 
immigration felony.52  Starting in August 2003, Attorney General Ashcroft 
announced the addition of new categories to the NCIC database, including 
categories for people who have committed civil immigration violations.53     
Filling the NCIC database with information about millions of people with 
minor civil immigration violations results in poor data management and 
enforcement problems.54  While the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) reports that an immigration status query takes fifteen minutes, some 
local law enforcement officials have reported that it takes several hours to 
get the results of a single query.55  This delay results in part because 
immigration records have high levels of inaccuracy.56  As stated by the 
National Immigration Forum, a “factor compounding the inaccuracy 
problem was the decision of the Attorney General in 2003 to exempt [the] 
NCIC database from the accuracy requirements of the Privacy Act, in effect 
relieving the government of responsibility for ensuring that records are 
accurate, timely, and reliable.”57  Based on these concerns, the Committee 
of the Major Cities Chiefs Association (MCCA) recommended that civil 
detainers be removed from the NCIC database.58   
Moreover, local law enforcement lack clarity regarding the appropriate 
use of the database and training regarding the expansion of the database.  
The federal government has not provided guidance to non-MOA states and 
localities on the proper use of the NCIC database.59  Consequently, these 
non-MOA police officers overstep their authority by arresting individuals 
without probable cause or detaining them without reasonable suspicion.  For 
example, if the police run a name through the NCIC database and find that 
an individual is listed in either the absconder subfile—meaning a removal 
order was issued for an individual—or National Security Entry-Exit 
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Registration System (NSEERS) subfile, the police are not automatically 
entitled to a criminal warrant because neither removal orders nor violations 
of the NSEERS program are crimes.60  However, according to an 
Appleseed report, “it often appears that police are making arrests in cases 
where there is a match in the NCIC database, without the actual criminal 
warrant.  Accordingly many police officers may be stepping outside the 
scope of their authority.”61  Similarly, the Immigration Committee of the 
Major Cities Chiefs Association stated that “[t]he inclusion of civil 
detainers on the system has created confusion for local police agencies and 
subjected them to possible liability for exceeding their authority by 
arresting a person upon the basis of a mere civil detainer.”62  
The Migration Policy Institute (MPI) conducted an analysis of the use of 
the NCIC database by state and local police forces.  It found that of the 
20,876 immigration hits from state and local agencies from 2002 to 2004, 
the error rate—that is, the percent of hits where ICE could not confirm the 
information—was 42 percent.63  The MPI also found that 85 percent of all 
immigration violators identified in a statistically significant sample of the 
NCIC hits were from Latin America and 71 percent were from Mexico.64  
This information indicates that the NCIC files are not being used to further 
prevent criminal activity or a targeted antiterrorism agenda, as the DOJ 
policy proffers.65  In addition, immigration attorneys are ever more hesitant 
to send fingerprint checks to the police when seeking a background check 
because ICE may apprehend the individual if the NCIC check results in a 
positive “hit.”66  Thus, the NCIC database facilitates unfettered local police 
authority to enforce immigration law and disrupts the designation of 
authority between federal agents and local police. 
With or without an MOA, “[w]hen state and local law enforcement 
officials are not adequately trained and informed to ascertain the difference 
between a bonafide asylum seeker and an individual who may be 
fraudulently trying to circumvent the [immigration] system,” the lack of 
training and guidance for local law enforcement in immigration matters 
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disrupts the nation’s public safety agenda and burdens the immigration 
enforcement system.67   
III. PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OF   
IMMIGRATION LAWS  
The inappropriate use of NCIS and MOAs indicates that local law 
enforcement officers are diverting their time from the promotion of a public 
safety agenda to the enforcement of civil immigration law veiled under a 
national security agenda.  This section will outline the problems when local 
police enforce immigration laws outside of an MOA.     
A. Inadequate Funding for Additional Obligations Imposed on Local Law 
Enforcement. 
Local police involvement in an immigration agenda is not funded by the 
federal government.  Consequently, scarce resources are diverted from more 
critical law enforcement needs, which undermines community policing 
programs.68  According to the MCCA, “[s]ince the creation of DHS, federal 
funding for major city police departments has been greatly reduced.  Local 
agencies have had to take on more responsibilities in areas that have 
traditionally been handled by the FBI, whose resources are now focused on 
counter-terrorism efforts.”69  Further, given current resource levels, the cost 
of personnel, facilities, and equipment for local agencies to address the 
twelve million illegal immigrants currently residing in the United States 
would be crushing.70  A costly investment in immigration enforcement 
creates a budget-revenue shortfall for cities that are also dealing with 
financial issues related to transportation, waste management, parks, schools, 
and libraries.71  Thus, costly state- and local-level immigration agendas 
often allow for a misguided appropriation of money and resources.72   
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B. The Problem of Costly Litigation 
Another problem associated with police enforcement of immigration laws 
is the danger of costly litigation.  With immigrant plaintiffs proving 
successful in courtrooms nationwide, states and cities are left burdened with 
litigation expenses.73  Local agencies lack clear authority to enforce 
immigration laws, are limited in their ability to arrest without a warrant, are 
barred from racial profiling, and lack the training to enforce complex 
federal immigration laws.  Therefore, local police agencies that choose to 
enforce federal immigration law face an increased risk of being held civilly 
liable.74   
The “Chandler Roundup” and the expense of its ensuing litigation is an 
example of local police acting pursuant to the DOJ’s finding of inherent 
authority—supposedly giving local law enforcement the ability to enforce 
immigration law—and losing in court.75  Police officers from the town of 
Chandler, Arizona, joined federal agents in a five-day operation resulting in 
the deportation of 432 Hispanic immigrants.  The City of Chandler paid 
four hundred thousand dollars in a legal settlement after the plaintiffs 
alleged that the undocumented immigrants were stopped and questioned 
exclusively because of their apparent Mexican descent.76  Later, Arizona 
Attorney General Grant Wood stated that individuals in fact were stopped 
“for no other apparent reason than their skin color or Mexican appearance 
or use of the Spanish language.”77  Furthermore, the Chandler Roundup led 
to the filing of a thirty-five million dollar civil rights lawsuit brought by 
U.S. citizens and legal permanent residents against the City of Chandler.78   
By enacting legislation that directly prohibits local police from enforcing 
immigration laws not mandated by law (e.g., “Don’t Ask” ordinances) and 
excluding the presence of ICE in local police business involving civil 
immigration violations,79 state and local governments can avoid the high 
litigation costs, which directly burden the community and taxpayers.80   
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C. De-emphasis on Criminal Investigations 
Ultimately, the implementation of practices that allow state and local 
police officers to enforce immigration laws via their own in-house, 
nonfederally mandated programs may “de-emphasize certain types of 
criminal investigations in an effort to focus on enforcing immigration law, 
which would divert law enforcement authorities from their primary 
duties.”81  Judith Golub, of the American Immigration Lawyers 
Association, stated that “[i]n many communities, response times to 911 
calls are dangerously slow and police are no longer able to even investigate 
certain crime.  Law enforcement officials in these communities need to 
spend more time enforcing laws that only they can enforce, and need more 
resources to protect the neighborhoods in which they live and work.”82   
The types of offenses that trigger immigration consequences include 
crimes involving moral turpitude (e.g., certain forms of assault, theft, fraud, 
abuse) and relating to controlled substances and firearms, aggravated 
felonies (e.g., murder, rape, drug trafficking, robbery, burglary, deceit, 
failure to appear, illegal reentry), domestic violence, stalking, child abuse, 
fraudulent document use, and other specific offenses.83  These types of 
crimes will result in the arrest and ultimate deportion of an individual.  
When police focus on their job—the enforcement of criminal violations and 
enhancement of public safety—it makes sense that some individuals who 
are undocumented will be arrested.  However, arresting someone merely 
because of a civil immigration violation does not mean that crime will be 
prevented.  For example,  suppose that when an individual called to report a 
crime of domestic violence, police were required to check whether the 
witness and his family had compulsory liability insurance on their vehicle 
or whether their taxes had been filed.84  Quite possibly, individuals would 
adhere more fervently to these regulatory requirements, but cooperation by 
the populace to control crime would rapidly decline.85  
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D. The Problem of Racial Profiling 
Not surprisingly, racial profiling exists in cases involving ICE officers 
and border patrol agents.86  Immigration officers familiar with the case law 
are experienced enough to create prefabricated profiles that will convince 
courts that the officers’ stops were not based solely upon race or ethnic 
appearance.87  After stopping an individual, it is easy for an immigration 
officer to strengthen his case for reasonable suspicion through interrogation 
and then communicate the necessary articulable facts after the fact.88  
Without proper boundaries and designation of authority, state and local 
police officers may also abuse their authority by using the same tactics that 
immigration officers use in enforcing criminal and civil immigration laws.  
Naturally, the issue of racial profiling in local police enforcement of 
immigration law is complicated because there is no ironclad formula for 
formulating reasonable suspicion when detaining someone for a civil 
immigration violation.89  Nevertheless, local law enforcement should invest 
energy in arresting criminals, not individuals “suspected” of violating civil 
immigration laws based on their appearance, employment, or association 
with others who are undocumented or arrested for criminal matters.  
E. Immigration Detainers 
Another area where joint collaboration beteen ICE and police requires 
close scrutiny and observation is in local jails.  Under current practice, if a 
police officer brings an undocumented noncitizen to jail following an arrest, 
a stay at the jail—regardless of the length of the stay and even if no charges 
are ulimtately filed—will  most likely lead to the deportation of the 
noncitizen once an immigration detainer is issued.   
Today, many immigrants come into ICE custody due to a violation of a 
state or local law.  Under many state laws, the jailer who processes the 
arrestee in jail is obligated to report to ICE if they have reason to believe an 
individual is a noncitizen.90  Police and jailers flag individuals by picking 
out those with foreign sounding names or spotting those who list themselves 
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as being foreign born on intake forms upon arrival at the jail.91  It is 
believed by many ICE officers, police,  and jailers that a jailer possesses 
discretion to make a report to ICE in any case involving an undocumented 
noncitizen.  Currently, there are no federal or state laws providing guidance 
in this area of discretionary reporting; there are no definitive court cases 
either.92 
After ICE receives a report of an individual in custody, who may or may 
not be a noncitizen, ICE almost always issues an immigration detainer  by 
transmitting an I-247—the immigration detainer—to the jailer.93  The I-247 
form is the immigration detainer, or “immigration hold.”94  An immigration 
detainer is a notice to the jail that they must tell ICE when they are releasing 
the individual.  It permits the jail to hold a person for up to forty-eight hours 
after release for ICE to come and act on the arrest.95  The immigration 
detainer prevents the immigrant from being released on bond, and it ensures 
that the immigrant will be taken into immigration custody upon release.96  
ICE cannot extend the forty-eight-hour period, and ICE must appear in 
person within forty-eight hours to assume physical custody of the 
immigrant.  If not, the jail must release the individual.97 
Prosecutors must charge any individual once in custody with a crime 
within forty-eight hours (not counting weekends and holidays).98  If a police 
officer or a prosecutor does file criminal charges, then the individual must 
be released if (1) the charges are dropped, (2) the individual is granted bail, 
(3) the case is won, or (4) the sentence is complete.99  However, in many 
localities with large immigrant populations, ICE officials have a constant 
and vigilant presence at the jails, interviewing immigrants daily.100  
Because ICE and police work together, ICE will inquire about his or her 
immigration status and transfer him or her into immigration custody101 
when police flag the individuals who they suspect are noncitizens, 
regardless of whether the noncitizen is charged, the charges are dropped, or 
jail terms are completed.   Thus, many immigration detainers are being 
placed on individuals before they are even charged with a crime.   
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Several complications arise from the immigration detainer process.  The 
most frequent is the violation of the forty-eight-hour time period between 
the issuance of an immigration detainer  and ICE assuming physical custody 
of the individual.  Reports are surfacing nationwide of extraordinarily long 
lapses before the noncitizen is transferred from a local jail to an 
immigration detention facility.102  In one case, a young Mexican woman 
waited three months in jail to be transferred to a detention facility after 
being arrested for driving without a license.103  The possibility for habeas 
corpus petitions are ripe104—violations of the terms of the immigration 
detainer can result in civil liability for the jailer under 42 USC § 1983, as 
well.105  However, immigrants in custody are often unaware of relief 
mechanisms in place.   
In the past, ICE would place holds on people for violations of criminal 
immigration laws such as theft or domestic violence.  Today, the flagging of 
immigrants for civil immigration violations reveals another new and 
worrisome trend that highlights an agenda to arrest, detain, and deport 
anyone suspected of violating any immigration law.  In the most frequently 
reported cases, individuals are arrested for driving without a license and 
subsequently taken into custody where ICE then places holds on them.106  
Not only does arrest for minor offenses followed by a flag for ICE to 
impose a hold create evidence that may fall short of the requisite probable 
cause standard for the arrest, but it also calls into question police tactics if 
immigrants are being stopped based on their appearance.  Police are able to 
consensually communicate with an individual without reasonable suspicion, 
and at times, they may inquire into the person’s immigration status.  If the 
individual responds or seems agitated, arguably, police may have enough 
evidence to determine that there is probable that an individual is unlawfully 
present in the United States.  And though police, unless mandated by an 
MOA, should not be arresting individuals for civil immigration violations, 
police are doing so in localities where there is a lack of clarity in 
immigration enforcement.107   
VOLUME 7  •  ISSUE 1  •  2008 
336 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
ICE, police, and jailers should work together to arrest, flag, place 
immigration detainers on, and subsequently deport individuals who are 
guilty of a criminal immigration violation.  When  individuals are picked up 
by police for a mere civil immigration violation and subsequently taken to 
jail to procure their deportation, an anti-immigrant agenda is highlighted 
that is not only frightening to immigrants but that also threatens our 
constitutional guarantees.   
F. Distrust of Police: The Downfall of Crime Prevention and Public Safety 
When no ironclad formula exists for determining reasonable suspicion in 
police enforcement of immigration law and when local police enforce 
immigration law without clear federal authority designated by law, a heavy 
burden is placed on the community.  Crime prevention and public safety 
suffer, and distrust of local police becomes a constant repercussion of local 
police action.  Undocumented individuals are extremely wary of reporting 
criminal activity or assisting police in criminal investigations when police 
damage the relationship with the communities they serve.108  The fear of 
deportation for noncitizens often deters them and their family members 
from reporting abuses, making it more difficult for police to effectively do 
their jobs.109 
According to the National Immigration Forum, “[i]t is the need to 
effectively protect the whole community that has led scores of police 
departments to reject policies that would expand their role in federal 
immigration law enforcement.”110  For example, Attorney General Wood of   
Arizona stated that “[i]t is mutual trust and respect that will in turn enhance 
the ability of local police to obtain from willing citizens the information and 
support necessary to carry out their mission to protect and serve.”111  To 
promote trust, police should refrain from enforcing immigration laws.  As 
examples, two states and several localities have adopted procedures that 
discourage local involvement in enforcement of immigration laws.112  
Sometimes localities address these issues through resolutions, city 
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ordinances, special orders from the police chief, or departmental policies.113  
Many of these measures stipulate that the localities’ funds cannot directly or 
indirectly be used for the purpose of enforcing immigration laws.114  Such 
measures create trust. 
G. Immigrants as Victims 
1. Afraid to Step Forward 
If immigrants are reluctant to report crime because of collaboration 
between ICE and local police, criminals will be encouraged to further 
victimize immigrant communities.115  Police should maintain a relationship 
of trust with the local population, regardless of citizenship, so that victims 
of crime can step forward without the fear of revealing their status.116  At 
the forefront of this concern are victims of domestic violence.  In passing 
the Violence Against Women’s Act (VAWA), Congress recognized the 
need to address the concerns of battered immigrant women by allowing 
them to obtain legal immigration status without having to be dependent on 
their abusers117  These women will only be safe if courts issue protective 
orders against the abusers.  In order to facilitate this, police must effectively 
assist these women; therefore, part of the job of the police is to gain the 
trust and faith of battered immigrant women.118  
If police are equated with ICE agents, entire households of battered 
women and children will be reluctant to take initial steps to become 
independent of their abuser out of fear of the police—the individuals 
assigned to “serve and protect.”  Many women are worried that reporting 
their abusers may conclude with deportation of themselves and their 
abusers.  Even more troubling is when abusers continue to batter, relying on 
the threat of deportation.  For example, in 1998, an immigrant woman in 
New Jersey, Elena Gonzalez, was found murdered in the basement of her 
apartment.119  Elena’s friends reported that the murderer, her former 
boyfriend, consistently threatened to report her to ICE if she did not do 
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what she was told.120  When an immigrant woman has to choose between 
her safety and the likelihood of deportation, crime prevention is difficult to 
achieve and the immigrant community is less safe.  
2. Hate Crimes 
Hate crimes toward immigrants are on the rise.  A heightened anti-
immigrant sentiment has also blocked immigration reform, spurred anti-
immigrant propaganda, and sought to turn local police into immigration law 
enforcers.121  Undocumented individuals are extremely vulnerable targets 
for hate crimes because they may not speak English, they are  
undocumented workers, they may keep cash on their persons and in their 
homes, and they are likely to be reluctant to report crimes to law 
enforcement.122  The FBI reports that anti-Hispanic hate crimes rose by 
almost 35 percent between 2003 and 2006.  According to President and 
General Counsel of MALDEF, John Trasviña, “[t]he FBI report should 
serve as a wake up call to our nation’s leaders to take action on 
comprehensive immigration reform, reduce tensions, and safeguard the 
basic civil rights and liberties of all Americans.”123  
The Southern Poverty Law Center produced a report outlining the 
dramatic increase of hate crimes, particularly those directed at Hispanic 
individuals.124  For example, Victor Hernandez, a Honduran immigrant 
dishwasher, was walking home from work when he was kicked into 
unconsciousness by teenagers who robbed him of $160.125  The two teens 
arrested told police they were “amigo shopping”—seeking vulnerable 
Hispanic workers to rob.126  Another example of the intentional 
victimization of undocumented individuals occurred in Tifton, Georgia, 
where six Mexican immigrants—men, women, and children—were 
murdered and at least five others badly injured.127  A group of robbers had 
rampaged through four trailer parks known for housing immigrant workers 
and murdered these men, women, and children.  The trailer parks are well 
known for home invasions, and months prior to the murders, over 20 homes 
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there had been invaded.128  A founding member of the Minutemen stated 
that the point of these kinds of hate crimes is to “make every illegal alien 
feel the heat of being a person without status.”129    
The lack of trust between immigrants and police sets the stage for the 
persistent recurrence of hate crimes.  Local police involvement in 
immigration enforcement serves as a deterrent for undocumented 
individuals who are seeking to report crimes, and the upswing in hate 
crimes directed at immigrants results in an entire community indirectly 
affected by violence.130  
3.  Trafficking 
Police must be thoroughly trained so that they possess the expertise 
required to handle extremely complicated cases, such as trafficking, that 
typically involve a high number of undocumented individuals.  Proper 
training of police officers is necessary to avoid responses that revictimize 
victims and decrease their willingness to serve as witnesses against the 
traffickers.131  For example, in July 1997, fifty-eight deaf and mute 
Mexican workers were discovered living as slaves in New York.  According 
to the National Council of La Raza, the workers “were tricked into coming 
to the United States and were absolutely exploited by their smugglers. . . .  
[T]hey were beaten, raped, traded, and shocked into submission with stun 
guns. . . .   [T]he immigrants feared going to the police because they were 
undocumented and their smugglers threatened to report them to INS.”132   
None of them had contacted the police because they feared being reported 
to the immigration authorities, making it apparent that police departments 
needed to actively engage with and reach out to immigrant communities in 
order to properly establish trust.133   
Without police assistance and cooperation, communities cannot work 
together to prevent such atrocities and punish perpetrators.  A predictable 
chilling effect on law enforcement, as it is being carried out nationally, will 
result if a noncitizen, lawfully or unlawfully present in the United States, 
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believes that calling the police to report a crime is likely to lead to police 
questioning regarding immigration status.134   
For the reasons discussed in this section, local police enforcement of 
immigration law should be avoided.  Enforcement of immigration law is 
costly and will likely result in litigation.  Further, if the local police’s role is 
to serve and protect the community, it does not bode well if members of the 
community are distrustful of the police and afraid to report crime.  Because 
undocumented citizens are often the most vulnerable to becoming victims 
of crime, as shown through the examples above, they are not being 
protected when they are afraid to contact their local police. 
IV.WASHINGTON: A NON-MOA STATE 
Washington is not an MOA state, meaning that state and local police are 
not deputized to enforce immigration law.135  Further, the Ninth Circuit has 
held that state and local officers are not authorized to make arrests for civil 
violations.136  Finally, Washington State Patrol Regulation 1.00.040 states 
that officers shall not stop, detain, interrogate, or place an immigration hold 
on any person solely for the purpose of ascertaining immigration status.  If 
police arrest someone for a criminal violation, officers have discretion to 
notify ICE if there is reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts that the 
person is undocumented, other than a person’s nationality, name, or ability 
to communicate in English.137   
Because an individual’s name, nationality, and ability to communicate in 
English are not factors that should be used to reach the requisite standard 
under the regulation, the reason for which a police officer would have 
reasonable suspicion to notify ICE is a slippery slope.  Under Regulation 
1.00.040, it seems that the only way a police officer could suspect that a 
person is undocumented would be if the individual stated to the police 
officer that he or she is undocumented; if the police officer called ICE or 
verfied the individual’s immigration status on the NCIC database; or if the 
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individual did not have a valid driver’s license or identification available 
during an interrogation stop, detention, or arrest.   
Sadly, in most instances, noncitizens do not know that they have the right 
to remain silent on if an officer inquires into immigration status, and their 
admittance allows police and jailers to flag them in jail.  Because police are 
not supposed to enforce civil immigration violations, but inevitably are 
doing so, attempts should be made to ensure that they are not singling out 
noncitizens in enforcing immigration violations and notifying ICE without 
reasonable suspicion based on proper articulable facts.     
Across the various jurisdictions in Puget Sound, local law enforcement 
agencies are dealing with immigrants in different ways.  In Seattle, for 
example, deputies act under an official policy that prohibits them from 
inquiring about an individual’s legal status.138  Conversely, in other cities 
and counties, unwritten policies and individual discretion guide law 
enforcement officers dealing with immigrants.  Many Washington cities and 
counties are working directly with ICE to target undocumented immigrants, 
and their justification for involving ICE ranges broadly.139  For example, in 
Lynnwood, ICE officers go on ride-alongs and share desk space with the 
Lynnwood Police Department.140  These statewide informal ties with ICE 
were initiated because of a demand for public safety, yet public safety is not 
ultimately improved by the police having an informal relationship with ICE 
and enforcing immigration law.141   
A. Pretexts Throughout Washington: The Impact and Foreseeable 
Consequences of Police Overstepping 
1. ICE as Interpreters 
However, reports of police not only enforcing immigration laws, but 
improperly using ICE interpreters are becoming more frequent in 
Washington.  In Mason County, the sheriff’s office detained, arrested, and 
subsequently deported twenty-four Guatemalans for alleged brush theft.142   
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Upon detaining the individuals, police officers called ICE for 
interpretation assistance because they could not find anyone who spoke 
Mam, despite the fact that local Mam interpreters were reportedly 
available.143  When local police enforce immigration law, opportunities 
arise for even more egregious behavior.  Under Regulation 1.00.040, every 
effort should be made to obtain interpreter assistance from sources other 
than ICE; ICE translators should only be used when all other sources are 
reasonably unavailable.144     
2. Informal Relationships: ICE and Local Law Enforcement 
Similar to the Mason County incident, the city of Lynnwood also justifies 
police collaboration with ICE.  Lynnwood gives courtesy desk space to ICE 
agents at the local police station station.  This informal relationship between 
Lynnwood and ICE also consists of ICE agents going on ride-alongs with 
Lynnwood officers in cases that involve suspected “illegal aliens”—
particularly if the investigation pertains to gang activity.145  The city of 
Bothell, Washington, also works with ICE directly;  Shannon Sessions, ICE 
spokeswoman, stated about the relationship, “It’s a convenient arrangement 
and has been helpful for educating our officers.”146   
This close and informal relationship with ICE creates many problems and 
runs the risk of violating individual civil rights.  For example, if police 
officers and ICE agents are going on ride-alongs together and they 
encounter an individual who could be undocumented, police cannot make 
an arrest unless they have probable cause to assume that a crime has taken 
place.  However, ICE agents are able to interrogate and subsequently arrest 
“any alien or person believed to be an alien as to his right to be or to remain 
in the United States” without a warrant.147  Thus, not only could police be 
facilitating the enforcement of immigration laws without authority, but they 
could be making investigatory stops on ICE’s cue and arresting individuals 
unlawfully with standards that fall short of the requisite reasonable 
suspicion or probable cause, but are in accordance with ICE authority.   
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In localities where ICE and city police officers team together and share 
resources, such as in Lynnwood, crime prevention is seemingly oriented 
towards the enforcement of immigration laws.148  For example, in ride-
alongs, Lynnwood police officers have arrested individuals for having a 
missing taillight, and the ICE agent accompanying the police officer has 
subsequently inquired into the individuals’ immigration statuses.149  
Another example is the arrest and ensuing deportation of a Lynnwood 
resident by an immigration officer when the resident attempted to pay a 
traffic fine.150  In Lynnwood, the chair of the Community of Color 
Coalition, Kinuko Nobirikawa, stated that “[i]nformation provided . . . by 
citizens and community groups indicates that the Lynnwood Police 
Department is actively working with ICE in setting up check points, 
stopping and detaining persons suspected by ICE.”151  Lynnwood called 
ICE to help them deal with gangs but instead used ICE to help stop people 
based on their race and inquire about immigration papers when they had 
been involved in something as minor as a traffic incident.  A nexus indeed 
exists between ICE and local police; however, this partnership is not 
authorized by federal law, designated in an MOA, or worthwhile to the 
community. 
3.  Case Study from Pacific, Washington 
a) Increased Deportation Proceedings 
Encounters with law enforcement in Pacific, Washington, often leave 
undocumented individuals in deportation proceedings.152  According to the 
City of Pacific police records, the largest amount of police activity between 
August 12, 2007, and August 30, 2007, consisted of transporting people to 
immigration detention centers.153  Pacific Lt. Edwin Massey tells his 
officers that they should pursue immigration issues, even though the 
department has no specific immigration enforcement policy.154  Under the 
guise of a traffic stop, Pacific police are using racial profiling to scan 
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people’s driver’s licenses and question their immigration statuses.155  Lt. 
Massey teaches officers that a police officer’s first clue that a motorist’s 
immigration status is in question may come when the officer runs a driver’s 
license and gets all zeros in place of a Social Security number.156   
Since January 2008, people have been pulled over by Pacific police for 
incredibly minor traffic violations, such as not having enough air in their 
tires.157  In September 2007, local police harassed and arrested a Pacific 
man, in the United States on a visitor visa, after his car was hit by another 
driver.158  The man was detained after showing his Mexican driver’s 
license.  In Washington, it is legal to drive with a foreign driver’s license 
for up to one year; a community activist pointed out, “Canadians do it all 
the time and never deal with these problems.”159  Yet in this case, a man 
was arrested despite showing his visa and was detained at the jail until the 
next morning.  While he was held in jail, he was unnecessarily 
fingerprinted—because he had a visa—and charged a fee for the process.160 
Given such incidents, Pacific Mayor Richard Hildreth gave a public order 
to the Pacific Police Department to stop inquiring about immigration status; 
however, six additional people were detained for “immigration violations” 
subsequently.161  Commenting on the large numbers of immigrants detained 
after encounters with local police, Police Chief Calkins of Pacific stated, 
“I’m proud of my officers and the job they’re doing.  I told them if there’s a 
violation, whether federal, state, whatever, they’re not to just turn their 
backs on it.”162   
Across Washington, deportation may ensue after a mere encounter with 
police or hosted ICE agents.  Tactics like those of the Pacific Police 
Department inevitably lead to the detention and deportation of individuals 
who often have no criminal record and are merely in the United States 
without legal authority.  After being detained by police officers and brought 
into custody, these individuals must remain in jail and await their transfer to 
an immigration detention facility, such as the one in Tacoma, WA.163  In 
IMMIGRATION 
An Up-Close Perspective 345 
cities in Washington, this wait is long and becoming longer as space in 
Tacoma becomes less available.164 
b) The “How To” of Immigration Enforcement 
In response to a public record request, Sgt. Picket of the Pacific Police 
Department released his 2007 memo outlining “how to do immigration 
violations.”165  In the memo, Sgt. Picket explains, “I ask them directly if 
they are illegal.  Most of the time they say yes.  Sometimes they tell me I 
don’t have the right to ask about that.  At that point, I detain them for 
investigation of the immigration violation and put them in the back seat.”  
He then concludes “The violation comes here from the US Code Title 8.  In 
spite of what people in the immigrant community are being told, you have 
every right to investigate all violations of the law, including this one.  I may 
not be politically correct, but we are law enforcement officers and our job is 
to enforce the law.”166  Thus, Sgt. Picket misleads his officers to the 
detriment of the immigrant community and the public safety of all 
communities. 
c) Fear and Distrust: Community Members React 
As Sgt. Picket misleads Pacific police officers to believe that their role is 
to enforce immigration laws, he and his officers create a sense of 
apprehension and fear in the immigrant community to the detriment of 
public safety.  Though Chief Calkins of Pacific charges that the fear is 
being generated by “white activists and outside Hispanic people,” it 
undoubtedly has other sources.167  Other city council members in Pacific 
have accused community organizers of being agitators and of creating fears 
about nonexistent practices, and they say that if the Hispanic community in 
Pacific is really concerned, its members should be at city council 
meetings.168  However, at city council meetings, individuals have been 
asked outright if they are illegal, thus clearly indicating that anywhere that 
police officers are present is not a safe place to be in Pacific.169   
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Community organizers were left worried and waiting.  In September 
2007, feeling that more needed to be done than attending council meetings, 
the Hispanic community in Pacific planned a march.170  The organizers 
contacted the city of Pacific to ask what kinds of permits were necessary for 
the march and were told that there was no process.  However, four days 
before the event, Mayor Hildreth stated that the march was in violation of a 
pedestrian code and that all participants in the march would be arrested.171  
In addition, a public records request was made for a document covering the 
entire year with details similar to the one provided earlier about police 
behavior; the response to the request was that “there is no requirement to 
create public records based upon a request for records.”172  In all attempts to 
understand the situation in Pacific and speak out about the city police’s 
misguided understanding of the law, community organizers have been met 
with resistance.    
A letter from the Commission on Hispanic Affairs to Pacific Mayor 
Hildreth raised an important point: “because the majority of immigrants 
have come from developing countries where the government is traditionally 
corrupt and abusive . . . many cannot even see a uniformed officer without 
triggering traumatic memories.”173  To the immigrant community, the 
blossoming police state in Washington is not about creating public safety; it 
is about enforcing immigration.  This culture of abuse of power and distrust 
of local law enforcement is becoming more common place in Washington, a 
state considered to be immigrant friendly.174  According to the PEW 
Hispanic Center, between two hundred thousand and two hundred fifty 
thousand Washington State residents are undocumented.175  With such a 
large number of undocumented residents, local police must be wary of the 
potential impact of their enforcement authority.   
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V. PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE 
This article has outlined many of the consequences that ensue when state 
and local police enforce immigration law.  Furthermore, it has argued that 
allowing state and local officers to enforce immigration law is a mistake.  
The following sections list both long-term and short-term proposals to limit 
police enforcement of immigration laws and promote the public safety of 
those in the community.  These proposals also will be beneficial to our 
communities, empower individuals to come forth and report violent 
criminals, and uphold our constitutional rights.   
A. Proposals for Change on the National Front  
1.  Reform of Federal Law  
Fixing the immigration system requires reforming federal laws; it does 
not require influencing local police to take on this work independently or 
mandating they enforce immigration laws via an MOA.176  Some states and 
localities endorse using restrictive and punitive measures aimed at making 
their communities less hospitable to immigrants.  However, a 
nonsegregating and comprehensive reform policy will ensure that a reality-
based approach to immigration enforcement incorporates immigrants into 
the community recognizing them as a key ingredient of shared 
prosperity.177  How local agencies respond to the call to enforce 
immigration laws will fundamentally affect the way they police and serve 
2.
their communities.   
 Removal of Civil Immigration Detainers from the NCIC System 
Removing the civil immigration detainers from the NCIC would decrease 
the complexity of the NCIC system and contribute to the enforcement of 
criminal matters.  The integrity of the NCIC system as a notice system for 
criminal warrants and criminal matters must be maintained.  The inclusion 
of civil detainers in the system has created confusion for local police 
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agencies and has subjected them to possible liability for exceeding their 
authority by arresting individuals on the basis of a mere civil immigration 
violation.178  Therefore, in situations where an individual is arrested for a 
civil violation in the NCIC system, local agencies must require that police 
officers request a federal criminal warrant before making any immigration 
179
B.
 authorities, this section provides the following 
1.
related arrest.    
 Proposals for Change on the Local Front  
Police need to understand their duties and the consequences of their 
behavior.  Clear division between immigration enforcement and criminal 
justice enforcement must be drawn.  Similarly, the role of police and their 
authority to enforce immigration law must be properly outlined.  If law 
enforcement makes it clear that the reporting of a crime—such as burglary, 
rape, or murder—will not trigger an investigation into the immigration 
status of the witness, the entire community will be safer because deportation 
would not be a looming possibility.  In order for this to happen, a very 
strong division must exist between state and local law enforcement and 
those police and FBI agents—such as those dealing with trafficking issues 
and human smuggling—who assist the federal government in the 
enforcement of civil immigration laws.180  In order to create a strong 
division between
suggestions. 
 “Don’t Ask” Ordinances  
In Washington, Seattle is a model city for immigration purposes.  Seattle 
Municipal Code 4.18.015, the “Don’t Ask” ordinance, states that “unless 
otherwise required by law or by court order, no Seattle City officer or 
employee shall inquire into the immigration status of any person or engage 
in activities designed to ascertain the immigration status of any person.”181  
In 2003, Seattle sucessfully attempted to raise awareness of immigrant 
presence by highlighting immigrants’ colorful cultural heritage and social 
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vivacity.182  Moreover, Seattle acknowledged that as an equal service 
provider to all residents,183 an obligation existed to respond to the attacks of 
9/11 by addressing individual fears of being reported to ICE.184  When 
enacted, Don’t Ask ordinances promote efforts of police and public health 
departments to cooperate with immigrant communities in order to reduce 
cr
eed with an arrest or a 
ci
ime and improve public safety in those communities.185     
Most importantly, Seattle acknowledges that all of its city officers and 
employees should be afforded guidance with respect to inquiries into 
immigration status.186  The Don’t Ask ordinance enacted in Seattle has 
made immigrants part of the community, not second-class citizens afraid to 
contribute to the social welfare in their area.  The ordinance has also given 
procedural order to past questions police had when dealing with 
immigration enforcement.  Don’t Ask ordinances list the ways in which city 
officials and employees can provide support to immigrants and adhere to 
federal law.187  When faced with the question of a criminal suspect’s 
identity, an officer should proceed in the same way he or she would with 
any suspect in that situation, asking for all forms of identification that do 
not require asking about immigration status.  If the officer is not satisfied 
with the suspect’s identity, then he or she can proc
tation pursuant to the law or department policy.188 
Confidentiality policies, like the Don’t Ask ordinance in Seattle, treat 
immigration status as a confidential matter and prohibit inquiry.  Though 
proponents of immigration restrictions in police matters argue that 
confidentiality policies do not protect communities from undocumented 
immigrants who commit crimes, immigrants who commit crimes are 
arrested and treated like any other potential criminal.189  In a 2007 audit, the 
Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General found that such 
policies in the jurisdictions it surveyed did not violate federal law and did 
not impede police cooperation with ICE regarding criminals in police 
custody.190  Once the individuals are in custody, ICE can detain them; 
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 departments to educate their 
d impose liability, for example, in dealing with 
IC subfiles.191 
wever, police should not enforce immigration laws or place immigration 
detainers on individuals—that is ICE’s job.   
Immigration status should not be used to feed noncitizens, through the 
criminal justice system, into ICE’s hands.  Criminals are subject to the 
criminal justice system.  Eventually, these criminals will enter into  the 
immigration enforcement system as well, but only once they are 
apprehended and channeled out of the criminal justice system.  Criminal 
justice and immigration are not one and the same, and should not be treated 
the same by police officers.  If immigration status is to become a question 
of importance in criminal enforcement and if immigration enforcement is to 
fall under the jurisdiction of a police officer’s duty, then accountability 
must be assured to validate everyone’s civil liberties.  Given that police do 
not understand their duties clearly and only a few localities implement 
Don’t Ask ordinances, Miranda warnings should be implicated
immigration is questioned, allowing every individual to unde
consequences in both the immigration and criminal justice system
2. Defining Officer Duty and Training Police Without MOAs 
The authority of state and local police must be clearly defined.  When a 
locality has a policy that defines a police officer’s limits, community 
leaders and advocates are better able to explain roles and expectations to 
both the immigrant population and the police.  A local policy that clarifies 
state and local police authority and dissuades police from immigration 
enforcement enables and encourages police
members on issues that coul
a matched name from the NC
a) Training to Create Trust 
Police must understand the demographics of their community, and as 
ethnic populations grow, attitudes must reflect responsiveness and 
understanding.  Diversity training to all city employees on an annual basis 
IMMIGRATION 
An Up-Close Perspective 351 
will help to create an immigrant-friendly attitude.192  If police make an 
effort to be viewed as members of the community, the fear and distrust will 
be dispelled.  Once trust is gained, police can begin to host community 
forums in safe locations, such as faith-based environments, that will address 
the concerns of immigrants and allow them to serve as vigilant community 
members.  As diversity grows in cities such as Lynnwood, police must be 
more watchful of their actions.  The goal is that some day, police can even 
sponsor a Cinco de Mayo festival or multicultural fair, where information 
ab
 Recruiting, hiring, and training a 
m
, and t  costly consequences 
d be involved in decision-
 
the same 
out police, safety, and other city services can be informally distributed 
without creating fear in the immigrant community given police presence.193   
In order to create trust and promote protection in immigrant communities, 
police departments should make an effort to properly train and motivate 
their employees.  For example, police and city employers should explore 
incentive-based pay and recruitment efforts for bilingual staff who can 
speak primary languages other than English.194  Police and city staff should 
increase recruitment for city job, board, and commission positions to better 
reflect the demographics of their cities. 
ore diverse police force will allow members of the immigrant population 
to relate to officers that look like them.  
The politics of immigration are very complex.  Dialogue with community 
activists and legal advocates can be a valuable method to educate police 
officers with respect to immigration enforcement of civil immigration, the 
implications of their actions on the community he
of racial profiling, and police officers shoul
making respective to each of these issues.195   
b) Training and Racial Profiling Safeguards 
Trainings for police officers on racial profiling and immigration 
enforcement should be mandatory, and community organizations and 
lawyers should train police, alongside ICE, to assure that all have 
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sta
untability, thus 
nally, it will provide 
. 
 
rds to community organizations and 
la
ndards.  It is of utmost importance that police officers be informed of the 
parameters of their role and be held accountable for their actions.   
Police should develop a database to record the number of arrests they 
make where ICE is called, immigration status is questioned, or detainers are 
issued.  It is difficult to hold police accountable for abuse when data is not 
made available and immigrants are afraid to make reports.  Thus, lawyers 
and community organizations should continue documenting and monitoring 
how police are treating immigrants; how immigrants are responding to 
reports of police officials stopping, arresting, and detaining individuals for 
civil immigration violations; and how police are inquiring into immigration 
status and dealing with questionable status.196  Collecting and monitoring 
data will promote transparency and allow for acco
preventing future suits and costly litigation.  Fi
immigrants with a voice to reflect the injustices they face
c) Immigration Detainers at State and Local Jails 
Accountability within local and county jails is also another high priority. 
Understanding the strategies that police and ICE use to identify individuals 
and acknowledging the delays and complications with transfers will help 
highlight potential constitutional claims and relief for immigrants in jail.  
Jails must hand over public reco
wyers studying the process in order to comprehend the actual policies and 
practices of the jailers and ICE.197   
Furthermore, jailers and ICE should work together in jails when dealing 
with individuals who have questionable immigration status and serious  
criminal charges, as those charges will likely lead to severe consequences in 
the immigration system.  Nonetheless, the way in which jailers identify 
nationality and immigration status must be lawful and preceded by a 
Miranda warning. Flagging those who were arrested for mere civil 
infractions and identifying those people as “aliens” for ICE review based on 
their place of birth or foreign-sounding name seems more anti-immigrant 
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than helpful.  An absolutely critical response to the immigration detainer is 
a call to give Miranda warnings if questioning about immigration status on 
intake forms at jails.198  Miranda warnings, though not currently required in 
immigration enforcement issues, should be implicated when immigration is 
questioned because a noncitizen should be granted the right to understand 
th
ublic safety are processed by both the 
cr
different strategy.  Thus, immigration inquiries at jails should be made only 
e consequences that would ensue in both the immigration and criminal 
justice system if they listed a place of birth on an intake form,. 
The implications of any and all statements made in jail and during arrest 
should be addressed in a Miranda warning.  The jailer should also avoid 
making any reports to ICE regarding noncitizens, unless such information 
came after a Miranda warning.199  Giving a Miranda warning to individuals 
before they state anything that could potentially lead to an immigration hold 
would assure that ICE focuses their attention on interviewing and holding 
people with severe criminal charges and harsh consequences in the 
immigration system.  In that sense, burglars, domestic violence abusers, 
drug traffickers, and other violent arrestees who, once out of the criminal 
justice system would likely face aggravated felony charges in the 
immigration system, would fall into the hands of ICE.  A Miranda warning 
would not only assure that rights are granted to all arrestees but would also 
ensure that attention is paid where attention is due.  Driving without a 
license and being a drug trafficker are two distinguishable crimes, each 
implicating much more than just duration of time served.  ICE is 
extraordinarily busy when visiting jails, and if ICE were better able to work 
to ensure that those who threaten p
iminal justice system and the immigration system, efficiency will be 
enhanced and justice better served. 
 A clear division in authorities between police and ICE must be outlined 
in order to detain those who truly deserve to be detained by ICE.  
Immigrants are quickly learning to avoid answering questions to police and 
on intake forms, and sooner than later, police and ICE will have to employ a 
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for those individuals suspected of violating criminal immigration laws, and 




y to come forward without fear of arrest should be an inherent 
go
re likely that 
immigrants will attend education and enforcement meetings.   
themselves  
 Community Education 
Education is a fundamental step in the pro-immigrant struggle.  If and 
when the appropriate effort is made, perhaps education—the most obvious 
means of individual empowerment—will prevent much of the struggle 
ensuing from police enforcement of immigration laws.  First, as discussed 
above, police must enter into a respectful relationship with immigrants.  
Subsequently, in order to provide immigrants with the necessary 
educational tools, the educational syllabus must provide both a basic and a 
complex agenda.  Both police officers and immigrants must be properly 
educated on the pertinent enforcement issues.  Trusted community leaders 
and lawyers can be instrumental in taking the first steps tow
migrants about city services and the role of the police.200   
Moreover, immigrant communities should be aware of the law in their 
state and locality.  Oftentimes, having a Don’t Ask ordinance in a city is not 
enough if immigrants are not aware of the ordinance.  Police officers, 
community groups, and other pro-immigrant programs should promote the 
law.  Encouraging immigrants who are crime victims or who are aware of 
illegal activit
al of all.   
Lastly, educating and preparing the immigrant community for 
enforcement actions is also invaluable.201  Such education can be done by 
utilizing the media outlets and developing enforcement information packets 
for families.202  A communication plan should be developed to inform the 
community about local police enforcement issues.  By knowing that the 
community cares about issues affecting immigrants, it is mo
IMMIGRATION 
An Up-Close Perspective 355 
4. Community Organizers Response 
Community organizers and activists play a key role in the advancement 
of immigrant rights in communities where state and local police are 
unavailable and unresponsive.  Community organizers, working with police, 
can provide multilingual newsletters and support citizen education 
awareness efforts.  They can also partner with key government officials, 
local agencies, ethnically owned businesses, and diverse faith-based 
organizations to disseminate information and highlight positive stories of 
police and immigrants working together.203  Doing so will create forums for 
educational outreach and ultimately result in a positive perception of police.  
Long-term goals such as supporting partnerships that provide English as a 
second language classes, citizenship instructions, and other resources for 
communities will allow police and community members to better 
understand each other.   
Suggestions for community responses include working with social 
service agencies and local police to pool resources.  For example, agencies 
can create and prepare a database of the names and contact information for 
volunteer translators or develop ways to fund translators; establish a toll-
free phone number for individuals to call when they or their family member 
faces a run-in with police and their immigration status was questioned; and 
create a network of counselors, social workers, and clergy who can provide 
counseling.204  The community organizers’ efforts, alongside police efforts 
to avoid immigration enforcement, will inevitably receive a positive 
response from immigrant community members.  
Lastly, community organizers should use the media effectively and to 
their benefit.  This can be accomplished through the development of a list of 
individuals who can talk to the media and who can work closely with 
programs such as Univision or Radio Sol to inform the immigrant 
community of issues affecting them.  Open communication will ultimately 
lead to increased trust.  Moreover, it is also valuable to develop 
relationships with national organizations that can help with media 
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strategy.205  By working together, broadcasting issues affecting immigrants, 
and giving immigrants a forum to always turn to for assistance, the 
community can work together to stay aware and informed. 
5. Legal Services Response 
In addition, legal services should anticipate police enforcement issues 
when defending immigrants in criminal or immigration proceedings.  
Attorneys should understand how to advise victims who fear immigration-
related inquiries when dealing with police.  Furthermore, legal services can 
assist in providing advice to those agencies, including the police and other 
social service agencies, about the constitutional and criminal authorities in 
place.  Attorneys can determine the level of commitment and the need for 
training and translators; they can give “Know Your Rights” presentations; 
and most importantly, immigration and defense attorneys can work closely 
together to assure that immigrants’ rights are being upheld when threatened 
by collaboration between police and ICE.206 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Laws, ordinances, and informal policies encouraging police control in 
immigration enforcement matters must be discouraged.  It is all the more 
important to establish local policies that preserve effective community 
policing and protect immigrants’ rights from the overstepping of state and 
local police officers.  Today in Washington and across the United States, 
strong policies that protect immigrants’ access to police protection are 
pitted against enforcment policies that encourage police to enforce 
immigration laws.  The political pressure to introduce anti-immigrant 
measures has not only created an unprecedented surge in state-level 
lawmaking, but also spurred rising resentment in the country.207  As 
Washington Governor Christine Gregoire stated, “the lack of 
comprehensive reform at the federal level places an additional burden on 
law enforcement officials.”208  Let us not burden law enforcement with 
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immigration issues, but rather keep them focused on enforcing criminal 
justice and promoting public safety. 
It is extremely important that we limit police authority in the immigration 
realm and implement strategies to improve communication between the 
immigrant community and police.  Enforcement of immigration law by state 
and local police does not encourage public safety; rather, it deflects 
resources that promote and encourage individual well-being.  Allowing 
state and local officers to enforce immigration laws only contributes to this 
xenophobic and anti-immigrant approach.  It is for the benefit of all 
communities that state and local police refrain from enforcing civil 
immigration laws. 
The line between police assisting the federal government and police 
enforcing immigration laws is thin.  Advocating that criminal aliens be 
detained and arrested by state and local police officers ignores the fact that 
police already have the authority to arrest criminals, both in enforcing state 
or local laws and in assisting the federal government.  Everyone in the 
United States is subject to American law, and likewise, everyone in the 
United States should feel as though the officers who serve their 
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